Status Of Forces Agreement Iraq
On the other hand, a U.S. military presence, even in an advisory capacity, should cause headaches for Abadi with some pro-Iranian elements within his own Shiite community. Pro-Iranian militias have criticized the U.S. military presence in Iraq and may in the near future receive orders from Tehran to launch attacks against U.S. forces, as they did several years after the U.S.-led invasion in 2003, which killed hundreds of U.S. troops with explosive devices sent from Iran or through direct fighting with those militias. In a joint hearing before the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs for the Middle East and South Asia and the Subcommittee on International Organizations, On March 4, 2008, Ambassador David M. Satterfield, Senior Advisor to the Secretary and Coordinator for Iraq, stated that seven substantive reports had been held with members of Congress on the future agreement between the United States and Iraq.18 He also stated that the government intends to negotiate two separate agreements with Iraq. The first agreement would constitute a legally binding sofa to define the legal status of US forces in Iraq. The second agreement, called the “strategic framework agreement,” would address all of the issues outlined in the Declaration of Principles. According to Ambassador Satterfield, the administration “does not consider this at this stage to be a legally binding agreement…. If that were to change during the discussions, we will of course inform Congress and take appropriate action in accordance with our constitutional provisions. 19 According to the U.S. State Department, the “strategic framework agreement” is considered a legally binding agreement between the United States and Iraq and is included as such in the publication “Treaties in Force”20.On November 17, 2008, Iraqi Secretary of State Hoshiyar Zebari and U.S.
Ambassador Ryan Crocker signed the agreement at an official ceremony.  The Aswat al-Iraq news agency reported a mixed reaction from the Iraqi population to the news that the cabinet had approved the agreement. Residents of the town of Sadr in Baghdad, a stronghold of Muqtada al-Sadr, said they believed the agreement was signed too quickly, while a wider “Vox Pop” of Iraqis across the country said they believed the agreement would become a point of disagreement.  Deborah Haynes, “General Ray Odierno: We may miss Iraq deadline to stop al Qaeda terror,” Times Online, April 9, 2009. (A joint assessment between the United States and Iraq would determine whether troops should remain in certain cities to continue fighting Al Qaeda members. The final decision to maintain the military presence beyond 30 June 2009, the withdrawal period, belongs to Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki.) Available at www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/iraq/article6069734.ece. However, on the basis of a 2010 Supreme Court decision (refined by subsequent decisions in 2013 and 2015), Parliament does not have the power to initiate laws that interfere with the constitutional duties of the executive. The court`s interpretation of the Constitution is that the government is responsible for the development of the policy, and the legislature may refuse to pass bills, but not initiate it. Although security issues and external relations are clearly enshrined in the Iraqi Constitution as executive functions, Article 61 of the Constitution gives Parliament the power to pass laws setting rules for international agreements.